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ABSTRACT 
We explore the relationships between aggregate profitability and women’s growing share 
of market work in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s. Using decomposition 
analysis and counterfactuals, we investigate whether the contribution of the declining 
wage share to the upswing in profitability was aided by the growing incorporation of 
women into the workforce. Results show that women helped to moderate the decline in 
the aggregate wage share. The counterfactuals suggest that the reduction in gender pay 
disparity overwhelmed the negative effect of women’s growing share of market work on 
the wage share. The decline in the wage share was driven primarily by distributional 
changes within the sectors rather than by changes in the composition of value added. In 
sectors where wage shares fell, however, women did not restrain the fall, indicating that 
the aggregate outcome was the net result of distinct sectoral trends in women’s 
employment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Gender relations can play a constitutive role in determining the key variables influencing 
the pace and rhythm of capitalist accumulation. Feminist economists have long 
recognized the effects of competition between male and female workers on the average 
level of wages: “Capitalists have indeed used women as unskilled, underpaid labor to 
undercut male workers, yet this is only a case of the chickens coming home to roost—a 
case of men’s cooptation by and support for patriarchal society, with its hierarchy among 
men, being turned back on themselves with a vengeance” (Hartmann 1979). However, 
the effects of such competition on the functional distribution of income or how the 
accumulation process itself may set the limits to such competition are questions that have 
not been given sufficient attention. Macrodynamic models that take gender relations 
explicitly into account are of recent vintage, but they suggest that secular feminization of 
market work might boost profitability and growth in high-income countries (e.g., Erturk 
and Çağatay 1995; Erturk and Darity 2000). 
A significant strand of the empirical work on the overall dynamics of 
accumulation in advanced capitalist nations focuses on dissecting the trends in aggregate 
profitability (Duménil and Lévy 1992; Brenner 1998; Zacharias 2002). However, most of 
the empirical work on developed capitalist nations does not address the potential effects 
of gender disparity in pay or the growing feminization of employment on aggregate 
profitability. Our main purpose is to make a modest attempt to tackle this much-neglected 
question in the context of the upward swing in profitability in the United States during 
the 1980s and 1990s.  
Recent work has analyzed the contribution of different factors to the rise in the 
profitability. For example, Edward Wolff (2003) has suggested that the shift in power 
relations in favor of the capitalist class and structural change as reflected in the growing 
share of labor intensive sectors in total employment were the main factors behind the 
profits boom. Duménil and Lévy (2002) also found evidence supporting the existence of 
the upswing in profitability utilizing a variety of measures of profitability and assessed 
the relative importance of technological change and distributional shifts. We begin by 
briefly recapitulating this familiar ground and showing by means of decomposition   3
analysis that the profits boom was underwritten to a substantial degree by a shift in the 
functional distribution of national income in favor of capital. 
We then turn to examine how the changing functional distribution of income was 
shaped by the increased integration of women into paid employment at both the 
aggregate and sectoral levels. Recent work by Kade Finoff and Arjun Jayadev (2006) 
finds a strong negative correlation between the feminization of the labor force and the 
labor share of national income in the OECD countries between 1975 and 2000. However, 
our work differs from their work in two significant ways. First, rather than regression 
analysis, we use a decomposition methodology to separate the effects of the trends in 
women’s employment and wages on the labor share and, in turn, on the general rate of 
profits. Second, we disaggregate the economy into seven sectors and examine the 
influence of structural change and distributional shifts within sectors on the movement of 
the aggregate wage share. 
By its very nature, decomposition analysis of the type conducted in this paper 
(and in other studies of aggregate profitability cited earlier) is descriptive. It does not 
allow for any direct inference about the causal mechanisms that might have generated the 
observed outcome. However, the decomposition analysis can shed light on the factual 
implications of a causal mechanism. Consider, for purely illustrative purposes, a potential 
casual explanation of the rising profitability of the manufacturing sector sketched as 
follows. The bargaining power of labor was weakened as a result of the threat of foreign 
competition; consequently, manufacturing workers could not secure wage gains that kept 
pace with productivity gains, leading to an increase in the profit-wage ratio of the 
manufacturing sector. In turn, the rise in the profit-wage ratio contributed to the rising 
profitability. Now, a decomposition of the manufacturing profit rate can only provide a 
clue as to whether the last step of the causal story (i.e., its observable implication about 
the effect of a rising profit-wage ratio on the profit rate) was borne out by the data. It 
cannot tell us about the validity of the postulated causal mechanism (i.e., foreign 
competition weakening the bargaining power of labor).
1 
                                                 
1 While the empirical validity of the observable implication of a causal mechanism is not the sole criterion 
by which a theoretical hypothesis is judged in normal scientific practice, it is definitely an important 
consideration. Regression models are also open to similar caveats regarding causality.   4
The focus of the present paper is on the effect of feminization on profitability. 
Using a classical model of prices of production, it is trivial to show that the comparative 
static effect of a rising share of lower-paid workers in total employment would be an 
increase in the long-run profit rate because of its direct effect on lowering the average 
wage.
2 As already noted above, recent macrodynamic models that explicitly incorporate 
gender relations have also arrived at a similar conclusion. Decomposition analysis can 
provide some indication regarding the operation of these effects in the profits boom of the 
1980s and 1990s. 
TRENDS IN PROFITABILITY 
The economy-wide average profit rate, measured empirically as the ratio of profits to the 
value of capital stock, is a concise measure that combines information on the functional 



















where Y is the amount of value-added, W is the wage bill, andK is the value of capital 
stock (all magnitudes are measured on a nominal, per annum basis, with the exception of 
the capital stock that reflects year-end values). The profit rate varies inversely with the 
ratio of the wage bill to value-added or wage share (ω ). On the other hand, it varies 
positively with the real output-capital ratio and the ratio of the price index of net output to 
the price index of capital stock. The first term in the second line of Equation (1) reflects 
the functional distribution of income, while the second is a joint indicator of the 
technology in use and the rate of capacity utilization. Typically, historical accounts of 
capitalist dynamics in the classical/Marxian tradition treat technology and distribution as 
                                                 
2 The lower average wage could also have indirect effects on the rate of profit via changes in the methods 
of production employed and relative prices. These indirect effects of the growth in female labor supply, 
though worthy of study, are probably much harder to quantify than the direct effect on the average wage.   5
the fundamental variables that determine the long-run trajectory of the profit rate, with 
the full recognition that the variables in question have reciprocal relations with one 
another (Duménil and Lévy 1990).
3 
There have been recurrent debates about “the” appropriate empirical measure of 
profit rate (Mueller 1990; Shaikh 1999). In our analysis we employed two of the most 
widely used measures—gross and net profit rates. Both had the same measure of capital 
stock—current-cost, net stock of fixed capital. The difference between the two is in the 
measure of profits: gross profits are the difference between the GDP and employee 
compensation of private industries and net profits exclude depreciation and indirect taxes 
(net of subsidies) from gross profits. The results of our analysis were pretty much the 
same for both measures; therefore we report only the results based on gross profit rates.
4 
Average gross profit rate in the U.S. private sector during the period 1947–2005 is 
shown in Figure 1. The data suggest that there were two distinct periods of sustained 
growth in profitability (defined here as a prolonged period of stable or rising annual profit 
rates). The first phase, occurring toward the end of the so-called “golden age” of U.S. 
capitalism, lasted from the trough of 1958 to the peak of 1966. The second phase, starting 
from the depression-like conditions of the early 1980s, lasted from 1982 to 1997.
5 Since 
1997, the profit rate has not displayed any sustained movement in either direction. 
 
 
                                                 
3 The rate of capacity utilization is considered in this tradition as the main determinant of the cyclical 
fluctuations in the profit rate (Shaikh 1999). 
4 The data on value-added and employee compensation was taken from the “industry” section of the 
website of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), U.S. Department of Commerce 
(http://www.bea.gov/industry/index.htm). Gross value-added in private industries is the “gross product 
originating” definition of the BEA. The data on capital stock was downloaded from the “fixed assets” 
section by the BEA website (http://www.bea.gov/national/FA2004/index.asp). Capital stock refers to “the 
current-cost net stock of private nonresidential fixed assets” definition by the BEA.  
5 The periodization of the upswings in the profit rate was performed by examining the smoothed profit rate 
series (the smoothing was done using the standard Hodrick-Prescott filter). Visual inspection of the filtered 
series suggested that a sustained upward movement in the profit rate begins from the first year of the 
chosen period and ends in the last year of the period. For example, 1982 is the year from which the filtered 
profit rate in every year is higher than the profit rate of the previous year and 1997 is the last year for which 
this observation is true. Since the latter period (1982–1997) is the focus of this paper, we also conducted a 
Chow test to examine whether the two chosen years could be considered as breakpoints in the profit rate 
series stretching from 1947 to 2002. The results of the Chow test confirmed the results from the visual 
inspection. The F-values for 1982 and 1997 were, respectively, 34.38 (0.0001) and 6.38 (0.003) (numbers 
in parentheses indicate the p-values). Our periodization also generally accords with what followed in 
similar studies cited in the paper (Wolff 2003; Dumenil and Levy 2002).   6




























































































Utilizing the standard decomposition technique (e.g., Wolff 2003) we can resolve 
the change in the profit rate between any two years into the contributions made by the 
profit share ( 1 π ω ≡− ), real output-capital ratio, and the ratio of the price index of output 
to that of capital stock.
6 The results from the decomposition analysis indicate that the 
main driving factor behind the rise in profitability in both periods was the rising real 
output-capital ratio (Table 1).
7 However, a stark difference between the two periods 
emerges once we examine the behavior of the profit share. During the “golden age” its 
                                                 
6 Consider the equation  x yz = . The standard decomposition resolves the change in  x  between two 
periods (say 0 and 1) into the weighted sum of changes in the right-hand side variables according to the 
following equation: 
10 10 10 () () x xz y y y z z −= − + − , where the bar over a variable indicates that it is the 
average of the values corresponding to the two periods. 
7 The BEA does not publish a series for the price deflator of net capital stock. We derived an implicit 
deflator by converting the current dollar series into a chained-dollar series using the quantity index for net 
capital stock (available from the BEA, Table 4.2) and then calculating the ratio of the current dollar series 
to the chained-dollar series. Such a procedure is justified because the percent change in the chained-dollar 
values will be identical to the percent change in the quantity index. The chain-type price index of value-
added was taken from the “industry” section of the website of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), 
U.S. Department of Commerce (http://www.bea.gov/industry/index.htm).   7
contribution to the 6.17 percentage point increase in the gross profit rate was a mere 0.03 
percentage point (less than one percent of the total increase in the profit rate). In contrast, 
its contribution to the increase of 9.92 percentage points in the gross profit rate during the 
recent phase of rising profitability—the “leaden age”— was a substantial 1.97 percentage 
points (about 20 percent of the total increase in the profit rate). 
 





   1958–1966 1982–1997 
Actual change in gross profit rate  6.17  9.92 
Contribution of:     
Change in profit share ( 1 π ω ≡− )  0.03 1.97 
Change in real output-capital ratio ( rr YK )  5.80 5.39 
Change in relative price of output ( yk p p )  0.34 2.56 
 
 
The accounting separation made between the profit share and output-capital ratio 
in the decomposition analysis does not imply a causal separation. In fact, they may reflect 
two interrelated aspects of the same underlying process: a rise in profitability may take 
place because growth occurs predominantly in labor-intensive activities (which generally 
have lower output-capital ratios) characterized by labor relations weighed heavily in 
favor of capital (larger shares of contingent and part-time workers, low levels of 
unionization, etc.) that help in keeping wage growth below productivity growth. As noted 
in the introduction, decomposition analysis cannot tell us whether such a process indeed 
generated the observed outcomes, yet it does provide some quantitative indication of the 
relative impact of the characteristics of the underlying accumulation process on the two 
variables that govern the profit rate; it turns out that the main variable responsible for the 
changes in the profit rate during both periods was the real output-capital ratio rather than 
profit share.
8 
                                                 
8 The decomposition of the determinants of the profit rate into wage share and output-capital ratio is not a 
causal separation also because these variables are not independent of each other. Any significant change in 
the output-capital ratio due to technological change can be expected to have an effect on the wage share via   8
However, the huge difference in the contribution made by the profit share to the 
surge in profitability between the two periods is a confirmation that a fundamental shift 
had occurred in the social and political arrangements governing the distribution of 
productivity gains between capital and labor between the two periods, apparently in favor 
of capital, as discussed by several scholars (e.g., Marglin and Schor 1991; Gordon 1996). 
Among the various factors that distinguish the golden and the leaden ages, an important 
difference is the much higher participation rate of women in market work in the leaden 
age. Given that the relative wage of women is lower, was the increased role of women in 
market work related to the considerable deterioration that took place in the wage share (or 
alternatively, the increase in the profit share)? As we pointed out in the introduction, 
theoretical models generally predict that, other things remaining the same, the greater 
incorporation of women into market work will lower the wage share and boost 
profitability. However, “other things” that affect the wage share did not remain the same 
during the period under consideration and this makes empirically disentangling the effect 
of the changes in gendered macroeconomic variables—women’s overall average wage 
and employment—from that of other factors quite a difficult proposition.
9  
Regression analysis with the macroeconomic series is not a feasible option since 
the number of years in the period under study is quite small. A feasible alternative is an 
extension of the standard decomposition methodology and this is the route that we take 
below. While this is not a substitute for a full-fledged causal analysis, we believe that it 
can yield some insights into the quantitative significance of the gendered macroeconomic 
variables on rising profitability during the leaden age.  
 
WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT AND FUNCTIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
 
The growth in women’s participation in market work—a persistent feature of American 
economic life since World War II—continued also during the period under study here. 
                                                                                                                                                 
its effect on labor productivity, while substantial changes in the real wage can influence the kind of 
methods of production that are employed (as well as the relative prices) and hence have an impact on the 
output-capital ratio. 
9 We borrow the term “gendered macroeconomic variables” from Nilufer Cagatay, Diane Elson, and Caren 
Grown (1995). In a sense, the approach taken in this paper can be viewed as an empirical implementation 
of the “gendered macroeconomic variable method” that they discussed.   9
Between 1982 and 1997, the employment-population ratio for women surged by nearly 
10 percentage points (from 47.7 to 56.8 percent) while that for men rose modestly by 2.3 
percentage points (from 69.0 to 71.3 percent). The change in the ratio for women was not 
dramatic compared to the trends in the previous years, but it was so for men. During the 
15-year period that ended in 1982 (1967 to 1982), the employment-population ratio 
increased by about 9 percentage points for women (from 39.0 to 47.7 percent), while for 
men it fell precipitously by about 9 percentage points (from 78.0 to 69.0 percent).
10 
Some analysts have argued that women have been pulled into market work in 
order to maintain family living standards in response to the decline in men’s earnings 
during the 1980s and 1990s. While most scholars recognize that the trend in men’s 
earnings did contribute to increased labor supply of (married) women, the extent of this 
contribution is generally considered to be small relative to other relevant factors. For 
example, Heidi Hartmann (2000) argues that in addition to the social and educational 
forces that have changed women’s expectations concerning their economic lives, it is 
more likely that women have increasingly entered market work in response to increase in 
the wages. These insights echo Francine Blau (1998), who argues that increases in 
education, which likely result from the increased prospects for women to have continuous 
attachments to the labor force, contributed to increasing labor force participation among 
women through its impact on wages. Additional explanations for women’s increased 
participation in market work include demographic changes, such as decreases in fertility 
rates, declines in marriage rates, increases in rates of divorce, and the shifts in the U.S. 
economy from manufacturing to services (Goldin 1990; Blau 1998; Figart and Hartmann 
2000).
11 
In addition to women’s involvement in market work, the extent of the gender pay 
disparity will also have an influence on the wage share. For any given increase in 
women’s share of total market work, the potential reduction in the wage share will 
                                                 
10 The employment-population ratios referred to in this paragraph pertain to individuals who are 16 years 
and older. They are based on annual household surveys and can be accessed at: 
http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab1.htm 
11 Focusing specifically on the labor supply behavior of married women, Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn 
(2005) found that the elasticity with respect to husband’s earnings was small and falling even prior to the 
1980s, and that the decline continued in the later years [see also Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for related 
analyses and references].   10
depend upon how much less women are paid, on the average, relative to men. A broad 
measure of gender pay disparity—the ratio of women’s mean earnings to men—showed 
an improvement of about 6 percentage points between 1982 and 1997 (from 61 to 67 
percent). Similar to the trends in the employment-population ratio discussed above, the 
decline in gender pay disparity during this period was not much different from that 
observed for the prior 15-year period. Compared to 1967, the relative wage of women 
was also 6 percentage points higher in 1982 (55 versus 61 percent).
12  
Explanations for the improvement in the relative earnings position of women 
during the 1980s and 1990s range from reductions in the human capital gap between men 
and women in terms of both education and labor force experience, to the decline in 
unionization (which hurt men more than women), to structural changes that have favored 
economic sectors (such as services) that employ relatively more women. In addition, 
gender segregation—by occupation, industry, establishment size, and type of 
employment contract—while persistent, has also decreased somewhat over time. For 
example, women are more likely than in the past to be employed in traditionally male and 
higher paying jobs, such as managerial and professional positions (Blau and Kahn 1997, 
2000; Hartmann 2000).
13 These factors aside, it is important to note that the narrowing of 
the wage gap, while reflecting absolute improvement in women’s wages, has resulted to a 
large degree from the decline or stagnation in men’s wages over time. The Institute for 
Women’s Policy Research calculates that this accounts for nearly three-fourths of the 
narrowing of the gap (Hartmann 2000). In spite of the improvements in women’s relative 
wage, a sizable gap still remains between male and female earnings.
14 
                                                 
12 The relative wage reported here pertains to full-time, year-round workers. They are based on annual 
household surveys conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and can be accessed at: 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/p39ar.html 
13 It is relevant to ask what effect the rise in overall wage inequality had on the gender wage gap over the 
period. One would expect that since women have tended to have less marketable skills than men, the 
factors that have aggravated wage inequality—technological change and international competition—would 
have a negative impact on the gender wage gap. Blau and Kahn (1997) found that over the 1980s the 
impact of rising inequality and greater returns to skill, while significant, was more than offset by 
improvements in women’s measurable qualifications and either a reduction in gender discrimination or an 
improvement in women’s unmeasured labor market skills. 
14 Stephen Rose and Heidi Hartmann (2004) looked at a number of alternative measures of earnings 
disparity in contrast to the conventional measure that considers only full-time, year-round workers in a 
given year. They utilized the longitudinal data available from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to 
develop their measures and found that the conventional measure may significantly understate the size of the   11
The standard decomposition of the wage share does not explicitly take into 
account the changes in women’s market work or wages. Instead, the change in the wage 
share is resolved into two terms: labor required per unit of net output (the reciprocal of 
labor productivity) and real wage. While real wages and labor productivity are highly 
correlated over long periods of time, heterodox economists generally hold that there is no 
automatic link between productivity growth and real wage growth. Changes in the wage 
share may then be understood as shaped by the variations in the extent to which social 
and political arrangements facilitate workers in capturing some of the gains in labor 
productivity in the form of higher wages (e.g., Lipietz 2001).
15  
For our purposes here, it is necessary to separate the male and female real wages. 
In order to capture the effects of the growing involvement of women in market work, it is 
also necessary to differentiate by gender the ratio of net output to labor. While these 
ratios are not susceptible to technological determination in a manner the average labor 
productivity is, changes in them may nevertheless be interpreted as reflecting a structural 
aspect of the accumulation process—the changing division of market work between men 
and women. Our extension of the standard decomposition represents these variables 
explicitly: 
                                                                                                                                                 
gender wage gap. For example, they found that the gender gap in average annual earnings over the 1983 to 
1998 period ranged widely from about 62.1 percent to 36 percent, depending on the population for which 
the earnings were computed. The former figure measured the gender gap in annual earnings calculated over 
all prime-age workers with reported earnings for at least one year between 1983 and 1998 whereas the 
latter measured the gap computed over all full-time, full-year workers with earnings reported each year 
over the period. Much of the discrepancy between these measures is due to the fact that women are 
traditionally less likely to hold full-time, full-year jobs and have continuous work histories. In addition, 
there is persistent segmentation of the labor market by sex in which women are more likely to earn less 
than their male counterparts both within and across traditionally female and male job types. 
15 In contrast, in standard marginalist theory, there is not much room for social and political factors to 
intervene in shaping how effective the workers are in capturing productivity gains because there are strict 
limits within which the wage share can vary. For example, if the aggregate production function is assumed 
to be Cobb-Douglas (i.e., 
1 YA K L
α α − = ) then it is easy to show that under the normal assumptions of 
perfect competition and homogenous factors of production ( and  K L represent, respectively, capital and 
labor) the equilibrium wage share will be equal to the elasticity of output with respect to labor (α ). With 
more general production functions, the constraint on the wage share is still technologically determined 
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In the above equation,  and 
mf ww are, respectively, the male and female nominal 
average hourly wage rates;   and  
mf LL  are the male and female hours worked;  r Y  is the 
real gross value-added;   and 
mf λ λ  are the male and female labor ratios (female and male 
labor hours per dollar of real GDP). Real variables, i.e., variables deflated with the price 
deflator for gross value-added ( y p ), are subscripted with the letter “r.” In an accounting 
sense, the contribution made by women or men to the change in the wage share would 
depend on the discrepancy between their wage growth and the fall in their labor ratio. In 
effect, we are taking the changes in the gender labor ratios and compensation rates as 
given, and estimating their impacts on the aggregate wage share. 
While the decomposition of the wage share based on Equation (2) does not 
necessarily imply causation, it should be noted that the results derived from it are not 
tautological. Thus, as discussed above, we know from the relevant data that during the 
period under study the wage share fell, women’s share of market work grew, and that 
gender pay disparity declined. The conjunction of these facts does not logically imply 
that the negative effect on the wage share stemming from the growth in women’s market 
work must have overwhelmed the positive effect due to the reduction in pay disparity. An 
inspection of the equation would show that, logically, the wage share could have fallen 
even if the net effect of the trends in women’s market work and wage on the wage share 
was positive. This outcome could have emerged solely as a result of the trends in men’s 
real wage and labor ratio. Therefore, we believe that the decomposition can help 
disentangle the quantitative effects of these different factors on the wage share during the 
period under study.  
The variables required to calculate the wage share as shown in Equation (2) are 
not available directly from the national income and product accounts (NIPA). Although 
the NIPA is rich in information, it contains no breakdown of employee compensation or   13
employment by sex. Thus, it is not possible to compute from the NIPA how much of the 
employee compensation is paid for women or how many of the aggregate hours of market 
work is performed by women. 
Our strategy to disaggregate the NIPA amounts of employee compensation and 
hours of work by sex was to estimate the male and female components of each of these 
variables from the Annual Demographic Supplement (ADS) of the Current Population 
Survey (the March CPS).
16 This estimation process consisted of two steps based on the 
assumption that the shares of women and men in wages and hours worked observed in 
the ADS holds for the NIPA aggregates.  
In the first step, we calculated hours worked per year for each worker as the 
product of usual weekly hours and weeks worked per year. Aggregating across all 
workers, we were able to calculate the total hours worked and the gender composition of 
employment. We divided the NIPA estimate of hours worked into male and female hours 
using the proportion calculated from the ADS. 
In the second step, we constructed a compensation variable for each worker that 
corresponds most closely to the NIPA concept of employee compensation. The latter is 
the sum of wages and salaries, employer contributions for social insurance,
17 and other 
labor income.
18 In order to approximate this concept, we augmented the wages and 
salaries received by each worker with the imputed amounts for payroll taxes and 
employer contributions for health insurance available in the ADS. Aggregating across all 
workers, we were able to calculate the total “augmented wage bill.” Just as in the case of 
aggregate hours, we split the NIPA estimate of employee compensation into male and 
female portions using the proportion estimated from the ADS.
19 
                                                 
16 The ADS (also known as the March CPS) is the source of official data on household income. More 
information about the ADS can be found at: http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/ads/smethdoc.htm. The 
calculations described in the text were carried out using the public-use version of the ADS microdata. 
Sample sizes for men range from 45,048 in 1982 to 36,583 in 1997, and for women from 36,942 in 1982 to 
33,169 in 1997. 
17 Consists mainly of mandatory payments by employers to the government for Social Security, 
unemployment insurance, and workers’ compensation. 
18 Consists of employer contributions to private group health and life insurance, private pension and profit-
sharing plans, private supplemental unemployment insurance, private workers’ compensation, and publicly-
administered government employee retirement plans. 
19 In both instances, we applied population weights to obtain aggregate estimates.   14
We recognize that this method has several shortcomings, especially as applied to 
the compensation data (e.g., topcoding of the ADS data, differences in the concept of 
wages and salaries, reporting errors in the ADS, etc.). Most importantly, in this context, 
the main source of discrepancy between the two sources (at least in terms of concept) is 
the lack of any estimates in the ADS for components of other labor income, except for 
health insurance, which is the single largest component of the NIPA category of “other 
labor income.”
20 Our inclination is to think that using the ADS proportions to split the 
NIPA compensation data between the sexes may result in overestimating the share of 
women in total compensation. This is because women’s share in jobs with fringe benefits, 
such as private pension and profit-sharing plans, is generally lower than men’s (e.g., 
Hardy and Shuey 2000). Unfortunately, there exists no comparable alternative to the 
March CPS for gender-specific information on the value of fringe benefits at the national 
level. 
 
Table 2. Decomposition of the Change in Wage Share, 1982–97 (in percentage 
points) 
Actual change in wage share (ω )  -2.73 
Contribution of:   
      Change in male hourly compensation (
m
r w )  4.03 
      Change in female hourly compensation (
f
r w )  4.41 
      Change in male labor ratio (
m λ )  -8.59 
      Change in female labor ratio (
f λ )  -2.59 
 
 
Once these estimates were obtained, we were able to decompose the change in the 
wage share during the leaden age using Equation (2). The negative contribution to the 
change in the wage share from men’s labor ratio was much larger than the positive 
contribution stemming from their hourly wage, with the gap between the two exceeding 
the overall decline in the wage share. For women, the opposite was true; that is, the 
                                                 
20 Employer contributions for health insurance amounted to about 55 percent of all other labor income in 
1997. Pension and profit sharing plans accounted for another 40 percent of other labor income in the same 
year; however, roughly 60 percent of these were publicly administered retirement plans for government 
employees. The remaining 10 percent was distributed between workers’ compensation, life insurance, and 
supplemental unemployment insurance.   15
negative contribution from the change in their labor ratio was outweighed by the positive 
contribution from the change in hourly compensation. Our results suggest that, in an 
accounting sense, the decline in the wage share was driven primarily by the unfavorable 
trend in men’s wage relative to their labor ratio. The fall in the wage share could have 
been exacerbated by the decline in women’s labor ratio, but this effect was offset by the 
growth in women’s wage. 
The notable growth in the female share of aggregate hours worked and 
employment reflects the movements in the gender labor ratios (Figure 2). Female share in 
hours grew sharply during 1982–1992 and then declined somewhat. Interestingly, the 
share in employment grew steadily throughout the period and was at relatively higher 
levels than the share in hours throughout the period, suggesting that women, on the 
average, had jobs that involve relatively fewer hours (e.g., part-time and part-year jobs 
with “flexible” schedules). 
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These trends indicate that at the aggregate level some amount of “substitution” of 
female for male labor took place during the leaden age. The substitution that occurred at 
the aggregate level surely must have been the result of a combination of forces that 
operated at the disaggregated level: loss of employment in male-dominated occupations 
and industries, replacement of male by female workers in some occupations and 
industries, and the faster growth of female-dominated occupations and industries.
21 For 
our purposes here, the interesting question is the impact of the substitution observed at 
the aggregate level on the wage share.
22 
As noted before, the direct channel of the impact is via the lower relative wage of 
women and its impact on overall labor costs. Additionally, the growing female share of 
employment could also be associated with the weakening of labor’s bargaining power 
and hence on lowering the ability of workers to procure wage gains in tandem with 
productivity growth. While we do not directly test this hypothesis here, it is useful to note 
some channels of influence. As argued by Stephanie Seguino, women’s lower relative 
wage “may signal weaker bargaining power on the part of female workers, leading to low 
unit labor costs, and an assumption on the part of employers of the reduced cost of 
extracting labor effort from female workers and limited resistance to poor working 
conditions” (Seguino 2000). The fact that a substantial share of female private-sector 
employees are employed in segments of labor market that historically have seen 
relatively low degree of collective bargaining also contributes to their lower bargaining 
power. The greater incidence of part-time and part-year work among women further 
weakens labor’s bargaining power. These difficulties are aggravated by the lack of state 
support for women workers in the form of public provision of childcare or mandatory 
maternity and childrearing leave. 
                                                 
21 A full investigation of the relative importance of these processes in shaping the substitution observed at 
the aggregate level, as well as their relation to the processes of globalization and structural and 
technological changes, is a task that is well beyond the scope of this paper. 
22 The increase in women’s share of market work also reflects the growth of, and women’s employment in, 
sectors producing market substitutes for products of household production (e.g., childcare and adult care, 
prepared foods, etc.). The effect of the latter on the aggregate wage share and profitability would depend on 
the institutional arrangements under which these substitutes are provided (e.g., public provisioning of 
childcare in the Scandinavian countries versus the predominantly private provisioning in the United States) 
and their conditions of production (e.g., the labor intensity of the activities, the presence of collective 
bargaining, etc.).   17
While the growing share of women in market work could have the direct and 
indirect effects discussed above, changes in gender pay disparity also affects the changes 
in the wage share. While the gap between female and male hourly compensation rates 
was still sizeable at the end of the period under study here, it did shrink during the period 
as a result of the various factors that were discussed at the beginning of this section. At 
the aggregate level, two factors emerge as central to this process in terms of mediating 
the effects on the wage share (see Figure 3). First, the narrowing of the gender 
compensation differential took place in an environment of stagnant or slowly growing 
male hourly compensation. Second, the decline was not occurring at a rate sufficient to 
push overall compensation growth to match or exceed the productivity gains attained 
during the period. Thus, the rise in gender pay parity could not prevent a decline in the 
wage share and did not pose a threat to the overall increase in profitability. 
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These considerations can be better illustrated by constructing two sets of 
counterfactual wage shares and profit rates. While the decomposition results are based on 
a comparison between the starting and ending years of the period under study, the 
counterfactuals can shed light on the year-to-year changes in the wage share and profit 
rate due to the changes in gender pay disparity and female share in total hours of 
employment. To construct the counterfactuals, it is helpful to express the wage share [see 
Equation (2)] explicitly as a function of the latter: 
 
  [ ] (1 ) ,
m
r ws s ω λδ =− +  (3) 
 
where  r LY λ = is the average labor requirement (the reciprocal of labor 
productivity),  f sLL =  is the female share in total hours of market work, and 
fm ww δ = is the ratio of female to male hourly compensation. The equation clearly 
implies that, holding everything else constant, the difference between the impact of an 
infinitesimal change in the female share in market work and a similar change in pay 
disparity will depend on the difference between the value of the pay gap () 1 δ − and the 
female share in market work, at which the change is evaluated.
23  
In the first counterfactual, we held the pay disparity ( ) δ  at its 1982 level and 
estimated the wage share and profit rate in each year utilizing the actual annual values for 
the other variables( , , ,and )
m
r ws λ ν   . Similarly, the second counterfactual was constructed 
by holding women’s share in hours of market work ( ) s  at its 1982 level and allowing 
other variables ( , , , and  )
m
r w λ δν to take their actual annual values. Even though women’s 
share of employment grew and gender disparity fell during the period under 
consideration, these counterfactuals are meaningful to consider because, theoretically, a 
rising share of female employment need not imply a fall in the gender pay gap. Such an 
outcome would be inevitable if the trend in women’s relative wage was only a function of 
the forces of (relative) supply and demand. However, as discussed earlier in this section, 
                                                 
23 This is because the partial derivatives of the wage share with respect to the female share of employment 
and wage disparity are, respectively,  ( ) 1
m
sr w ωδ λ = − and 
m
r ws δ ω λ =  .   19
the reduction gender pay disparity was driven to a large extent by other factors such as 
declining gender segregation and improvements in women’s educational attainment.
24  
The results of the calculations are displayed in Figures 4 and 5. Since the actual 
and counterfactual series will have the same values in 1982, we have shown the values 
for the other years as deviations from the 1982 levels to highlight the potentially 
divergent behavior of the different series. 
 
























Actual With 1982 relative wage With 1982 share in hours
 
 
                                                 
24 For example, if the degree of gender segmentation of labor had remained unchanged, the growing share 
of women in employment would occur mostly in the bottom rungs of the wage distribution. Other things 
remaining the same, such a process can indeed result in a rising rather than falling gender pay gap.   20





























If the relative wage of women had remained at its 1982 level, the decline in the 
wage share over the period 1982–1997 would have been much bigger than what was 
actually observed (a fall of 5 as against 3 percentage points); correspondingly, the 
increase in the profit rate would have been much higher than what was actually observed 
(a rise of 12 versus 10 percentage points). Conversely, if women’s share of market work 
had remained at its 1982 level, the fall in the wage share would have been somewhat 
smaller than actual (2 versus 3 points) and the increase in profit rate would also have 
been smaller (9.5 as compared to 10 points). In reality, as discussed above, women’s 
share in total hours did rise and the gender pay differential narrowed, thus resulting in 
actual wage share and profit rate series that lie between the two counterfactuals. 
However, the difference in the extent to which the two counterfactual series of changes 
diverge from the actual series of changes suggests that the narrowing of the gender pay   21
disparity played a significant role in ameliorating the decline in the wage share and the 
associated increase in profitability. 
Our finding that, in an accounting sense, women contributed to offsetting the loss 
in wage share during 1982 is apparently inconsistent with Finoff and Jayadev (2006) who 
found a negative correlation between wage share and female share of the labor force for a 
panel of OECD countries over the period 1970–2000. While they controlled for a number 
of factors (such as per capita GDP, unionization, etc.) in their regression analysis, our 
result is derived from decomposition analysis using data for a very specific period for a 
single country. These differences in data and methods might account for the different 
findings; yet, it is notable that Jayadev and Finnoff did not control for the differences in 
the gender pay disparity among countries in their regression models.  
 
DISTRIBUTIONAL SHIFTS AND COMPOSITIONAL SHIFTS 
 
We now turn to examine two issues that are relevant to our findings at the aggregate 
level. First, the fall in the aggregate wage share could have come about primarily as a 
result of a shift in the composition of aggregate output in favor of sectors with low wage 
shares. In such a scenario, the distributional shift that we observed at the aggregate level 
would appear to be considerably different in its macroeconomic significance from an 
alternative scenario in which the decline in wage share was primarily due to changes in 
the social and political environment in which employees were not able secure wage gains 
in tandem with productivity growth. The second issue relates to the moderating effect that 
women’s employment had on the fall in the aggregate wage share because the 
contribution from women’s rising wage outweighed the contribution from their falling 
labor ratio. If similar effects could be found in sectors where the wage share fell, we can 
confirm the existence of palpable sectoral analogs for the observed aggregate outcome. In 
its absence, the aggregate outcome would confirm the old macroeconomic maxim that the 
whole is different from the sum of the parts. 
Since the aggregate wage share is the weighted sum of sectoral wage shares, we 
can address the first issue by decomposing the following equation (using the same 
technique as described before, see Note 6):    22
  , ii i ω κω γ == ∑ ∑  (4) 
 
where  i κ  is the 
th i sector’s contribution to the aggregate wage share and   and  ii ω γ are, 
respectively, the 
th i sector’s wage share and share in total nominal value-added,  i YY . We 
separated the private sector into seven broad sectors.
25 While a case for greater 
disaggregation can be made, we believe that the interesting issue in our context is the 
impact of the decline of the manufacturing sector and the rise of service-producing 
sectors (trade, finance, etc.) on the variables of interest. 
 
Table 3. Decomposition of the Change in the Aggregate Wage Share by Sector, 
1982–1997 (in percentage points) 
 
Contribution of 










( i κ ) 
Wage 
share 





( i γ ) 
Agriculture, extractive, and construction  -1.18 0.93  -2.11 
Durable good manufacturing  -3.35 -1.51  -1.85 
Nondurable good manufacturing  -1.76 -0.85  -0.92 
Transportation and public utilities  -1.48 -0.95  -0.53 
Wholesale and retail trade  -0.81 -0.68  -0.13 
Finance, insurance, and real estate  1.03 0.15  0.88 
Services 4.85 0.46  4.40 
All private industries  -2.71 -2.45 -0.26 
 
 
                                                 
25 The data for the value-added and employee compensation for the individual sectors were also drawn 
from the BEA, as discussed in Note 4. A minor point to note regarding the sectoral disaggregation is that 
the sum of value-added of the individual sectors will be different from the aggregate value-added because 
of the very small amount of “statistical discrepancy,” the amount of value-added that could not be allocated 
across sectors. As a result, the aggregate wage share reported in this section differs slightly from that 
reported earlier.   23
The results of the decomposition are shown in Table 3. Structural change (as 
reflected in changing values of  i γ ) contributed to only about 10 percent of the decline in 
the aggregate wage share between 1982 and 1997. Much more important to the decline at 
the aggregate level were the falling sectoral wage shares over the period, suggesting that 
the changing conditions governing the distribution of productivity gains between 
employees and employers were the principal factor. The contribution of the change in 
sectoral wage shares was about 90 percent (or 2.45 of the total 2.71 percentage points) of 
the decline in the aggregate wage share over the period. Thus, while employment shifts 
during the period had a major positive effect on aggregate profitability via their effect on 
the organic composition of capital (Wolff 2003), their effect on profitability via the wage 
share appears to be rather small. Service-producing sectors that grew in relative 
importance contributed positively to the aggregate wage share via their own rising wage 
shares, indicating that the decline at the aggregate level happened in spite of, rather than 
because of, structural change. 
We now turn to the second issue raised at the beginning of this section, namely 
whether the moderating effect that women had on the falling aggregate wage share could 
be found at the level of the individual sectors where wage shares fell. We addressed this 
issue by decomposing the sectoral wage shares using the same procedure that we used for 
the aggregate wage share.
26 The results are shown in Table 4.
27 We have also shown the 
contribution (the sum of the contributions of labor ratio and hourly compensation) of men 





                                                 
26 As we pointed out in the context of the discussion of the decomposition of the aggregate wage share, we 
are not suggesting that the relationships examined by the decompositions are necessarily causal. We are 
taking the changes in the sectoral labor ratios and compensation rates as given and then estimating the 
impacts of these factors on the wage share. However, following the same logic as in the instance of 
aggregate decomposition, this does not mean that the results from the decomposition are purely 
tautological. 
27 The sectoral hourly compensation rates and labor ratios by gender were estimated by utilizing the ADS in 
conjunction with the national accounts. Details about the calculations are available from the authors upon 
request.   24
Table 4. Decomposition of the Change in Sectoral Wages Shares, 1982–1997 (in 
percentage points) 
Contribution to the change in wage 
share from change in: 
Real hourly 
compensation  Labor ratios 
Sector 





Agriculture, extractive, and construction  14.59 2.34 -7.22 -0.59  9.12
Durable goods manufacturing  28.07 8.11 -40.25 -8.60  -12.68
Nondurable goods manufacturing  3.25 3.69 -10.93 -5.79  -9.76
Transportation and public utilities 3.42 2.12 -10.05 -2.93  -7.44
Wholesale and retail trade  10.54 8.10 -14.63 -7.89  -3.87
Finance, insurance, and real estate  2.62 1.46 -2.31 -0.97  0.80
Services -1.25 0.33 2.06 1.19  2.33
 
 
Figure 6. Contribution to the Total Change in Wage Share between 1982 and 1997 

































Key: Agri: Agriculture, mining, and construction; Mfg-Dur: Durable goods manufacturing; Mfg-Nondur: 
Nondurable goods manufacturing; Transp: Transportation, communication, and public utilities; Trade: 
Wholesale and retail trade; FIRE: Fire, insurance, and real estate.   25
In each of the sectors where a decline in the wage share occurred—manufacturing 
(durable and nondurable goods), transportation, and trade—the decline was driven 
primarily by the unfavorable trend in men’s wages relative to their labor ratio. Unlike at 
the aggregate level, women contributed (in an accounting sense) to an exacerbation of the 
decline in the wage share in these sectors, i.e., growth in their wage did not offset the 
decline in their labor ratio. However, the contribution made by women to the fall in the 
sectoral wage share was much smaller than men, as can be seen clearly by a comparison 
of the heights of the bars in Figure 6. The trade sector constituted a minor exception in 
the sense that women contributed positively, though a very small amount, to the change 
in the wage share.  
If there were no significant sectoral parallels to the aggregate outcome, how did 
the aggregate outcome actually come about? This is a question that requires a detailed 
analysis of sectoral trends, which is a task that falls beyond the scope of this paper. Our 
preliminary inspection of the data suggests that there were two distinct factors behind the 
positive contribution from the change in women’s wage offsetting the negative 
contribution from their changing labor ratio at the aggregate level. First, unlike services 
where there was virtually no growth in female wages, other sectors saw wage gains for 
women (Figure 7). During this period, the share of services in total female employment 
rose rapidly from 37 to 45 percent, while the share of all other sectors declined (Figure 
8). Since services had higher wages than all the other sectors (with the exception of 
FIRE) in 1982 and two sectors in 1997, the shift in favor of services contributed to the 
growth in the female wage rate at the aggregate level. Increasing female wages in all 
sectors except services, as well as the shift of female labor from sectors with wages lower 
than services toward the services sector, were responsible for the overall growth in 
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Figure 8. Distribution of Women’s Total Hours of Market Work by Sector in 1982 
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Second, the growth in women’s employment in sectors other than services was 
slower relative to the growth in the respective sectoral GDP, leading to a fall in female 
labor ratios in these sectors (as shown in Table 4). The combined balance in these sectors 
between the negative pull from falling labor ratios and the positive push from rising wage 
for women would have gone in favor of the labor ratios (as it did for men) resulting in a 
overall negative contribution of women to the aggregate wage share, but this was offset 
by the rising labor ratio of women in the services sector. The rising labor ratio of women 
in this sector, coupled with the growth in the share of this sector in aggregate GDP (from 
16 to 23 percent), had the effect of restraining the decline in women’s labor ratio at the 
aggregate level. 
The service sector was unique among the sectors; it was the only sector to display 
rising labor ratios for both men and women, indicating that average labor productivity 
was lower in 1997 than in 1982. It was also the only sector in which the average real 
wage in 1997 turned out to be lower than in 1982 for men (as reflected in the negative 
contribution of this component in Table 4) and practically unchanged for women.
 28 
Therefore, the rise in the wage share of this sector seems to have come about through a 
perverse process of productivity falling faster than the average wage.
29  
Findings from the sectoral analysis suggest that, at least at the level of 
disaggregation used here, the aggregate outcome of the changing conditions of women’s 
employment exerting a moderating influence on the falling wage share had no significant 
sectoral parallels. In particular, this does not appear to be the result of women being 
increasingly employed in some dynamic sectors where gains from productivity growth 
are distributed more in favor of employees than employers. On the contrary, the marked 
shift in the sectoral distribution of women’s working hours in favor of the services sector, 
a sector in which average labor productivity fell, played a significant role in determining 
the aggregate outcome. 
                                                 
28 The characterization of the services sector as a low-wage sector holds only on the average. Several 
subsectors in it include some of the highest-paid occupations, such as legal and health services. 
29 The decline in the service sector’s labor productivity appears to fit its frequent characterization as the 
culprit in the familiar “cost-disease” model originally proposed by William Baumol (Baumol 1967; 
Baumol, Bateman, and Wolff 1987). The poor wage trends in the service sector, however, need not be the 
effect of low productivity in a causal sense, since the availability of a low-wage labor pool can make the 
less capital-intensive, low-productivity methods of production more profitable to firms (Thurow 2000).   28
CONCLUSION 
 
The United States witnessed a sustained rise in the aggregate profit rate during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Much of the empirical work on the recent rise in profitability has neglected 
the potential effects of trends in women’s employment and wages, though theoretical 
models indicate that such effects could operate via influencing the functional distribution 
of national income. The aim of this paper is to make a modest contribution to the study of 
these potential effects. We extended the standard decomposition technique to assess the 
contribution of women, in an accounting sense, to the decline in the aggregate wage share 
between 1982 and 1997. The application required gender-disaggregation of two 
macroeconomic variables: employee compensation and aggregate hours worked. Our 
method of circumventing this information gap in the national accounts by utilizing 
nationally representative household survey data might also prove fruitful in other 
contexts where specific subgroups of the working population need to be identified in 
analyzing a macroeconomic problem. 
In line with the previous literature, we found that the decline in the share of labor 
in national income played a much more important role in the profitability boom of the 
1980s and 1990s as compared to the profitability boom of the 1950s and 1960s. Our 
decomposition method allows us to resolve the change in the wage share into changes in 
real wages and labor ratios (ratio of hours worked to GDP) differentiated by gender. 
Results from the decomposition suggest that the decline in the wage share during the 
1982–1997 period was driven primarily by the unfavorable trend in men’s wage relative 
to their labor ratio. The fall in the wage share could have been exacerbated by the decline 
in women’s labor ratio, but this effect was offset by the growth in women’s average 
wage. We also constructed counterfactual wage shares and profit rates to assess the 
effects of feminization on yearly changes in these variables. The counterfactuals 
graphically illustrated that the increasing share of women in hours worked exerted a 
downward pressure on the wage share because of their lower average wage, but the 
reduction in the gender wage disparity over time ameliorated this negative effect. 
Changes in the sectoral composition of value-added in favor of low wage-share 
sectors could also result in a decline in the aggregate wage share, but our results indicated   29
that the overwhelming bulk of the decline during the period 1982–1997 could be 
attributed to distributional shifts within the goods-producing and trade sectors of the 
private economy. The decompositions of sectoral wage shares showed that the restraining 
effect that changes in women’s employment had on the fall in the aggregate wage share 
(because the contribution from women’s rising wage outweighed the contribution from 
their falling labor ratio) constituted a minor exception rather than the rule among the 
sectors where wage shares fell. We found that, just as at the aggregate level, the principal 
factor behind the declining wage shares were the unfavorable trends in men’s wages and 
labor ratios. The restraining effect observed at the aggregate level was not a reflection of 
women becoming increasingly integrated into some dynamic sectors of the economy 
where the distribution of the productivity gains went in favor of employees. It appears to 
be the net result of distinct sectoral trends in women’s employment and wages, with a 
marked shift to the services sector—a sector where productivity decline outstripped wage 
decline during the period—playing an important role.  
The macroeconomic effects of gender relations and the impact of macroeconomic 
conditions on gender relations in the United States are areas that require much further 
study. To approach this issue from the perspective of trends in aggregate profitability is 
admittedly only one possible approach. A complementary and fruitful approach would be 
to examine, as has been done in the case of some developing countries (e.g Seguino 2000, 
2006), the interrelationships between feminization, gender inequality, and long-run 
growth.    30
REFERENCES 
 
Baumol, William J. 1967. “Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of 
Urban Crisis.” American Economic Review 57(June): 415–26. 
 
Baumol, William J, Sue Allen Bateman, and Edward N. Wolff. 1987. Productivity and 
American Leadership: The Long View. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Bentolila, Samuel, and Giles Saint-Paul. 2003. “Explaining Movements in the Labor 
Share.” Contributions to Macroeconomics (Berkeley Electronic Press) 3(1): Article 
9.  
 
Blundell, Richard, and Thomas MaCurdy. 1999. “Labor Supply: A Review of Alternative 
Approaches.” in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card (eds.) Handbook of Labor 
Economics, Volume 3A. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 
Brenner, Robert. 1998. “The Economics of Global Turbulence: Uneven Development and 
the Long Downturn: The Advanced Capitalist Economies from Boom to Stagnation, 
1950–1998.” New Left Review May/June (Special Issue). 
 
Blau, Francine. 1998. “Trends in the Economic Well-Being of Women, 1970–1995.” 
Journal of Economic Literature 36(1): 112–165. 
 
Blau, Francine, and Lawerence Kahn. 1997. “Swimming Upstream: Trends in Gender 
Wage Differential in the 1980s.” Journal of Labor Economics 15(1): 1–42. 
 
————. 2000. “Gender Difference in Pay.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(4): 
75–99.  
 
————. 2005. “Changes in the Labor Supply Behavior of Married Women: 1980–
2000.” Working Paper No.11230. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER). 
 
Çağatay, Nilüfer, Diane Elson, and Caren Grown. 1995. “Introduction.” World 
Development 23(11): 1827–1836. 
 
Duménil, Gérard, and Dominique Lévy. 1990. “Post Depression Trends in the Economic 
Rate of Return for U.S. Manufacturing.” Review of Economics and Statistics 
LXXII(3): 406–13. 
 
————. 1992. The Economics of the Profit Rate: Competition, Crises, and Historical 
Tendencies in Capitalism. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar. 
   31
————. 2002. “The Profit Rate: Where and How Much Did it Recover?” Review of 
Radical Political Economics 34(4): 437–461. 
 
Ertürk, Korkut, and Nilüfer Çağatay. 1995. “Macroeconomic Consequences of Cyclical 
and Secular Changes in Feminization: An Experiment at Gendered 
Macromodeling.” World Development 23(11): 1969–1977. 
 
Ertürk, Korkut, and William Darity, Jr. 2000. “Secular Changes in the Gender 
Composition of Employment and Growth Dynamics in the North and the South.” 
World Development 28(7): 1231–1238. 
 
Figart, Deborah, and Heidi Hartman. 2000. “Broadening the Concept of Pay Equity: 
Lessons for a Changing Economy.” in Ron Baiman, Heather Boushey, and Dawn 
Saunders (eds.) Political Economy and Contemporary Capitalsim: Radical 
Perspectives on Economic Theory and Practice. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
Finoff, Kade, and Arjun Jayadev. 2006. “Feminization and the Labor Share.” Working 
Paper 06–4. Salt Lake City: International Working Group on Gender, 
Macroeconomics, and International Economics (GEM-IWG).  
 
Goldin, Clauda. 1990. Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of 
American Women. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Gordon, David M. 1996. Fat and Mean: The Corporate Squeeze of Working Americans 
and the Myth of Managerial “Downsizing.”  New York: Martin Kessler Books. 
 
Hardy, Melissa A., and Kim Shuey. 2000. “Pension Decisions in a Changing Economy: 
Gender, Structure, and Choice.” The Journals of Gerontology Series B: 
Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences 55(5): S271–277. 
 
Hartmann, Heidi. 1979. “Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex.” in Zilah R. 
Eisenstern (ed.) Capitalism, Patriarchy, and the Case for Socialist Feminism. New 
York: Monthly Review Press. 
 
————. 2000. “Closing the Gap: Women’s Economic Progress and Future Prospects.” 
in Ray Marshall (ed.) Back to Share Prosperity: The Growing Inequality of Wealth 
and Income in America. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
Kongar, Ebru. 2006. “Importing Equality or Exporting Jobs?: Competition and Gender 
Wage and Employment Difference in U.S. Manufacturing.” Working Paper 06-7. 
Salt Lake City: International Working Group on Gender, Macroeconomics, and 
International Economics (GEM-IWG). 
 
 
   32
Lipietz, Alain. 2001. “The Fortunes and Misfortunes of Post-Fordism.” in Robert 
Albritton, Makoto Itoh, Richard Westra, and Alan Zuege (eds.) Phases of Capitalist 
Development: Booms, Crises, and Globalizations. Hampshire, UK and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Marglin, Stephen A., and Juliet Schor. 1991. The Golden Age of Capitalism. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Mueller, Dennis. 1990. “Profits and the Process of Competition.” in Dennis Mueller (ed.) 
The Dynamics of Company Profits. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Rose, Stephn, and Heidi Hartmann. 2004. “Still a Man’s Labor Market: The Long-Term 
Earnings Gap.” Washington, DC: Institute for Women’s Policy Research. 
 
Seguino, Stephanie 2000. “Gender Inequality and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country 
Analysis.” World Development 28(7): 1211–1230. 
 
————. 2006. “Gender, Distribution, and Balance of Payments Constrained Growth in 
Developing Countries.” Unpublished manuscript. University of Vermont. 
 
Shaikh, Anwar. 1999. “Explaining the Global Economic Crisis.” Historical Materialism 
5(Winter): 103–144. 
 
Thurow, Lester. 2000. “Wages and the Service Sector.” in Ray Marshall (ed.) Back to 
Share Prosperity: The Growing Inequality of Wealth and Income in America. 
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.  
 
Wolff, Edward N. 2003. “What's Behind the Recent Rise in Profitability in the 1980s and 
1990s?” Cambridge Journal of Economics 27(4): 479–499.  
 
Zacharias, Ajit. 2002. “Competition and Profitability: A Critique of Robert Brenner.” 
Review of Radical Political Economics 34(1): 19–34.  
 